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THE                 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE, V.82, # 2, 2025, pp. 96-116

                           A DSGE FRAMEWORK FOR SOVEREIGN DIGITAL

                        CURRENCY ADOPTION IN SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES:
                    MACRO-FINANCIAL CHANNELS, BANK INTERMEDIATION,

                                          AND POLICY TRADE-OFFS

                                   Nazim Hajiyev  1,2 (Corresponding author) , Daniyar Aliyev 3

                    1  Department of Business Management, UNEC Business School, Azerbaijan State
                     University of Economics (UNEC), Baku, Azerbaijan, AZ1001
                      ORCID ID - 0000-0002-3093-2322, [email protected]
                    2 Development Economics Research Center, UNEC Business School, Azerbaijan
                      State University of Economics (UNEC), Baku, Azerbaijan, AZ1001
                    3  Elite Gymnasium, Baku, Azerbaijan, ORCID ID - 0009-0002-0891-7334,
                       [email protected]
                                       https://doi.org/10.30546/jestp.2025.82.02.2021

                        Received: June 06; accepted October 02, 2025; published online December 16, 2025

                    ABSTRACT
                    We build a tractable small-open-economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
                    (DSGE) model with monopolistically competitive banks to study the macro-financial
                    effects of introducing a sovereign digital currency (SDC) - here modeled as an account-
                    based central bank digital currency (CBDC). Households choose between bank deposits
                    and SDC holdings; banks finance loans largely with deposits and face a reduced-form
                    intermediation  capacity.  Mechanism  —  higher  attractiveness  of  an  interest-bearing
                    SDC mechanically substitutes away bank deposits, reducing bank funding and, absent
                    recycling, shrinking loan supply and lowering aggregate credit. Quantitatively, under
                    our  baseline  calibration  a  10%  reallocation  from  bank  deposits  into  SDC  implies
                    an≈3.2% contraction in bank lending and a consumption-equivalent welfare loss of
                    ≈0.039% (worst-case scenarios reach ≈8.0% welfare loss when recycling is absent and
                    intermediation  is  fragile).  Policy  experiments  show  that  (i)  modest  or  tiered
                    remuneration  on  SDC,  (ii)  limits/tiering  on  holdings,  and  (iii)  active  central-bank
                    recycling of inflows into bank funding substantially mitigate credit and welfare losses.
                    Our results are robust across parameter sweeps. Policy implication — combining tiered
                    remuneration with credible recycling is the most effective way to preserve credit while
                    delivering  the  liquidity  and  payment-system  benefits  of  SDC.  Limitations  —  the
                    analysis is theoretical, uses a reduced-form banking block and illustrative calibration;
                    country-level  empirical  calibration  and  endogenous  bank-risk  dynamics  are  left  for
                    future work.



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