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THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES: THEORY AND  PRACTICE


               active in state elections over three elections cycles we determine that these

               characteristics  and  the  spending  patterns  associated  with  them  can  be
               associated differentially with issue versus candidate advocacy groups.


                       Political Activity of Advocacy Groups


                       The extent of the election landscape in the United States combined with

               the complexity of tax and regulatory law relating to political advocacy groups has
               created  an  extensive  list  of  organizational  forms  for  such  groups. Groups  are

               classified as PACs (Political Action Committees), 527s, 501(c)s, and non-federal
               groups. A fundamental issue in the distinctions among these classifications relates

               to the locale of the political activity of an advocacy group. Groups that engage in

               activity  that  expressly  advocates  for  the  election  or  defeat  of  a  candidate  in  a
               federal election are subject to more rules and regulations than those who advocate

               for a specific issue or position, especially with regard to the level of fund raising
               and giving to candidates. Non-federal groups as well as 527s in their non-federal

               activity (and certain 501(c)s) are less regulated with regard to their fund raising

               and  spending. Needless  to  say,  however,  the  money  trails  between  advocacy
               groups are interwoven, complicated and purposely convoluted.

                       PACs, and to a lesser extent the more recently created 527s, have been
               subject to  a  great  deal of academic  analysis. Ansolabehere,  de  Figueiredo,  and

               Snyder (2003) examine both the reasons individuals make campaign contributions

               and the evidence that political influence is a result of those contributions. They
               separate  the  investment  motives  of  contributors  from  consumption

               motives. Contributions  as  investments  suggest  that  contributors  seek  a  political
               return from their contributions while consuming contributors are identified as not

               necessarily  seeking  a  political  return  but  rather  the  consumption  utility  of
               voluntary  participation  in  a  public  good  activity  or  association  with  a  specific

               candidate or issue.



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