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THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE



               is  abusive  requires  detailed  analysis  of  the  purpose  of  the  tie-in  and  the

               market context.
                     Sometimes two products are vertically related, with one good an input

               in  the  production  of  the  other.  If  so,  the  competition  agency  must  try  to

               understand the reasons for the tie-in. In general, a tie-in cannot be motivated
               by abuse if the two products are used in fixed proportions (as might be the

               case in an industrial process): the dominant firm could maximize profits by
               charging a sufficiently high price in the tying market, and the tie-in practices

               would not increase profits.
                     Tying is often motivated by the firm's desire to maintain or increase its

               reputation  for  quality  or  product  reliability.  This  should  not  be  considered

               abusive  since  it  increases  efficiency  and  market  demand.  For  example,  poor
               servicing  of  a  dominant  firm's  product  by  an  independent  company  may

               negatively  influence  the  reputation  of  the  dominant  firm  and  result  in  lower

               sales.  To  avoid  this  the  dominant  firm  might  sell  its  products  and  services
               together through a tie-in contract. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether

               the legitimate aim of the dominant firm to maintain or increase its reputation
               could be reached by less restrictive means, such as an improvement of its quality

               control processes.
                     Tying  raises  concerns  for  competition  policy  when  it  allows

               supranormal profits to be made in a properly defined market. This might be

               the case when tie-in practices raise entry barriers to competitors and enable
               the exercise of market power in the tied market. Tying can also be an abuse

               if used to evade price regulation on the tying good. Suppose a dominant firm
               has market power in its primary product. Suppose further that the dominant

               firm’s price is regulated, which effectively prevents it from earning all of the
               monopoly profits that it could if there were no regulation. The dominant firm

               would  have  an  incentive  to  sell  its  regulated  product  on  condition  that



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