Page 10 - Azerbaijan State University of Economics
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THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE, V.76, # 1, 2019, pp. 4-19



                    (a) Between 1995 and 2014, the EU has launched 99 AD (Anti-Dumping) initiations
                    against China, constituting 28% of the total.
                    (b) AD activity actually increased following China’s WTO accession in 2001.
                    (c) At the end of 2014, the EU had 51 AD measures in force against China (47% of
                    total), affecting less than 2% of bilateral imports. This puts the EU at third place,
                    behind the USA (93 measures in force, 38% of total) and India (76 measures, 37% of
                    total).

                    Moreover, according to  the  INTA Report (June 2016), the EU uses  trade defence
                    instruments  (TDIs)  less  than  many  other  jurisdictions,  and  only  0.21 %  of  EU
                    imports are affected. China has been by far the main target of AD duties imposed by
                    the  EU.  By  October  2016,  definitive  AD  duties  against  more  than  50 different
                    Chinese products were in place. AD duties against Chinese products concern mainly
                    the aluminium, bicycles, cement, chemicals, ceramics, glass, paper, solar panels and
                    steel industries. In most of them China has accumulated massive over-capacity.

                    The  report  explains  also  that  AD  measures  are  prevalent  over  the  AS  (Anti-
                    Subsidize) measure toward China. By October 2016, definitive AS  duties were in
                    place for five Chinese products. This is mainly due to the opacity of the Chinese
                    subsidisation scheme and the lack of cooperation of the Chinese authorities.

                    In addition, AD measures are not equally applied across all industries within the EU. They
                    are concentrated in the steel and chemical industries (Independent report for EP, February
                    2016).    China’s  comparative  advantage  could  stem  from  a  genuine  cost  advantage  of
                    Chinese producers. On the other hand, it might stem from dumping activity. Preliminary
                    evidence suggests that similar patterns exist in other countries (Ibid).

                    2.2 The Institutional process to issue new trade defence regulations
                       May  2016:  the  EP  adopted  a  resolution  on  China’s  market  economy  status.
                       Overwhelming opposition of Member of European Parliament (MEPs) to grant
                       MES  to  China  as  long  as  it  did  not  meet  all  five  EU  criteria  (The  European
                       Parliament  includes  the  five  market  economy  criteria  in  2008/2009  with  the  definition  of
                       significant distortions, in line with what the US does. This is key to justify the use of a non-
                       standard  methodology.  However,  not  only  the  criteria  to  define  a  “market  economy”  is  not
                       recognized internationally, but also it is not acceptable in relation to China’s accession protocol
                       in  the  WTO.). The EU should use a non-standard methodology in AD and AS
                       probes into Chinese imports in determining price comparability.

                       June  19  2016:  the  EP  called  on  the  Commission  to  submit  a  proposal  along
                       these lines.



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